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Abstract
In this essay, I intend to elucidate Thomas Nagel’s radical concept of moral luck and
the unnerving philosophical paradox that it inevitably arises when it is stripped to its
essence: in pursuit of a method of fair moral assessment, we approach the possibility that
nothing and no one can be aptly judged on moral grounds. I analyze some refutations to
this troubling paradox, including Susan Wolf’s promising rejection of the subcategory
RI FRQVHTXHQWLDO OXFN GXH WR WKH H[LVWHQFH RI D SURSRVHG ӷQDPHOHVV YLUWXHӸ ,Q OLJKW
of these refutations and Nagel’s and Bernard Williams’ musings on moral luck, I aim
to propose courses of action that can lead to a functional society despite the paradox
entailing the idea that humanity has no place for accurate moral judgment. In doing so,
I suggest that moral luck must, to an extent, be ignored, and that a practical approach
to humanity would continue to make moral judgments despite being threatened with
Nagel’s sound declaration that this behavior is not logical.

Paper
7KH HOGV RI PRUDO SV\FKRORJ\ DQG SKLORVRSK\ KDYH EURNHQ VLJQLFDQW JURXQG LQ
uncovering fascinating, yet deeply unsettling aspects of our moral composition and
judgments. The reason why the results of such hallmark psychological experiments as
0LOJUDPӵVREHGLHQFHVWXGLHVORRPODUJHLQWKHVHHOGVLVEHFDXVHRIWKHLUH[SRVXUHRIWKH
SRZHURIFLUFXPVWDQFHLQEULQJLQJRXWDODWHQWPDOHFHQFHLQSHRSOHWKRXJKWWRKDYH
no evil in their character. Though these unanticipated results have inspired a whirlwind
of doubt surrounding the status of human agency, morality, and character, it is the
SKLORVRSKLFDOPXVLQJVRI7KRPDV1DJHO  RQWKHFRQFHSWRIӷ0RUDOOXFNӸWKDW
perhaps venture most into troubling territory. Moral luck, coined by Bernard Williams
(1976, 1981), occurs when one does not account for the factors beyond an actor’s control
in condemning or praising the actor for their actions. In this essay, I seek to outline
Nagel’s account of moral luck and the distressing paradox that it entails when taken
to its logical conclusion. I will then examine and challenge the works of those who
reject Nagel’s account, the most robust and intriguing being Susan Wolf’s eȅǲEȤȵǙȘȤǾ
Moral Luck (2001), and discuss the philosophical implications of and practical response
WRWKHVHQGLQJV
At the crux of Nagel’s evaluation of moral luck is his distinction between four types of
luck subject to moral assessment: constitutive luck (luck in one’s genetics, inclinations,
etc.), circumstantial luck (luck in the situations one faces), luck based on antecedent
circumstances, and luck in the consequences or results of the action(s) in question
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(consequential luck) (Nagel 1979, 1). As the paradigmatic example explains, though it
seems intuitive that the drunk driver who does not happen to be driving in the path of
a child crossing the street should still be held equally morally accountable as the equally
drunk driver who does drive in this child’s path and strikes him, we tend to hold the
latter more accountable. The tug-of-war here between the intuition and the descriptive
evaluation of the situation that we see in real life is the heart of the issue of moral luck.
It seems that any conscientious philosopher would agree with Nagel and intuition
WKDWLWLVZURQJWRDOORZPRUDOOXFNWRLQXHQFHRXUHYDOXDWLRQLQWKLVFDVH+RZHYHU
the problem arises once we take moral luck to its logical conclusion, and approach the
dangerous notion that no one can ever be held morally accountable for any action. As
Williams (1981) asserts, making morality immune to luck may be an unattainable goal,
DQGӷDGPLUDWLRQRUOLNLQJRUHYHQHQMR\PHQWRIWKHKDSS\PDQLIHVWDWLRQVRIOXFNFDQ
VHHPWREHWUHDFKHU\WRPRUDOZRUWKӸ  1DJHOӵVWDNHLVHYHQPRUHSHVVLPLVWLFIRU
WKRVHZKRKRSHPRUDOMXGJPHQWVFDQWUDQVFHQGWKHFRQQHVRIOXFNӷ,IWKHFRQGLWLRQ
of control is consistently applied, it threatens to erode most of the moral assessments
ZHQGLWQDWXUDOWRPDNHӸ  ,IZHLQVSHFWPRUDOOXFNDQGLWVVXEFDWHJRULHVIXUWKHU
pessimism appears to be an appropriate response.
The interactions between Nagel’s proposed subcategories of moral luck make the
UDPLFDWLRQV RI WDNLQJ PRUDO OXFN WR LWV ORJLFDO FRQFOXVLRQ DSSDUHQW DQG FODULI\ WKH
paradox of moral luck. To return to the example, if we hold that it is the act of driving
drunk itself that is the morally reprehensible act, regardless of this action’s consequence,
then we ignore the constitutive and circumstantial luck that lie at the heart of one’s
decision to drive impaired. It cannot be true that the man who drives drunk and the
PDQZKRKDVQHYHUGRQHVRGLHUVROHO\LQWKDWGHFLVLRQ7KHUHPXVWEHVRPHGLHUHQFH
LQFRQVWLWXWLRQRUHOVHFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKDWOHDGVWRWKLVGLHUHQWDFWLRQ%HFDXVHWKHVH
GLHUHQFHVLQLQFOLQDWLRQVWHPSHUDPHQWHWFDUHHQWLUHO\RXWRIWKHLUFRQWUROWKHQWKH
GLHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHVHWZRPHQӵVDFWLRQVDQGFRQVHTXHQFHVPXVWDOVREHJRYHUQHG
by luck.
So, if we subscribe to ignoring moral luck in making moral evaluations, then it seems
even in cases like these that psychologically appear to be deserving of punishment on a
PRUDOEDVLVZHFDQQRWGHHPWKHWZRHYHQWVDVDQ\GLHUHQWPRUDOO\7KLVSDUDGR[RI
PRUDOOXFNӱZKHUHWDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWOXFNLQPDNLQJPRUDOMXGJPHQWVOHDGVXVWRQRW
EHDEOHWRPDNHDQ\PRUDOMXGJPHQWVӱLVLQWXLWLYHO\DQGSUDFWLFDOO\WURXEOHVRPH,IZH
adhere to ignoring factors outside of an agent’s control in making moral judgments,
then we may not be able to make any moral assessments whatsoever. One could not
claim that the serial killer is more morally accountable than his victims and similarly
we could not conclude that Mother Teresa was more virtuous than was Adolf Hitler.
The conclusion seems absurd, but, as outlined, it is borne from rather airtight logic in
ZKLFKӷWKHLQWXLWLYHO\DFFHSWDEOHFRQGLWLRQVRIPRUDOMXGJPHQWWKUHDWHQWRXQGHUPLQH
LWDOOӸ 1DJHO 7KLVSDUDGR[LVSRZHUIXOGDQJHURXVDQGZRUVWRIDOOPD\EHWKH
soundest approach to moral assessment. Indeed, reducing moral luck to its bare bones
may render the pursuit of legitimate moral judgment a fool’s errand.
34

SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Undergraduate Journal

Negotiating Moral Luck

Many philosophers refuse to accept this disconcerting notion, attempting to poke
holes at Nagel and Williams’ descriptions of moral luck. Brian Rosebury (1995) claims
that both Nagel and Williams’ examples to illustrate the problem of moral luck are
incomplete. He homes in on Williams’ classic example of Gauguin, the man who makes
WKHGHFLVLRQWRDEDQGRQKLVZLIHDQGFKLOGUHQLQSXUVXLWRIDOLIHDVDSUROLFWDOHQWHG
artist abroad in Tahiti (518). Rosebury argues that Williams focuses too much on the
LGHDRIFRQVHTXHQWLDOOXFNLQXHQFLQJWKHPRUDOMXGJPHQWVRI*DXJXLQZKHQLWLVFOHDU
that what is moral in this case is not the consequences of the action but the agent’s
deployment of knowledge and the degree of stringency with which Gauguin treats this
potentially grave decision. He claims that a case like Gauguin’s demonstrates the idea
that morality is not subject to the luck that one faces, but that moral choice is instead
ӷRIWHQ YHU\ ORQHO\  Ӹ DV D WUXO\ PRUDO GHFLVLRQ ZLOO GHSHQG RQ FRQVFLHQWLRXVO\
making a decision rather than the anticipation of blame or praise on moral grounds.
Rosebury’s argument is admirable, but fails to consider the full scope of Nagel’s
concept of moral luck. While intuitively it does seem that ignoring the consequential
luck of Gauguin’s situation may settle the dilemma of moral luck, even a hypothetical
where Gauguin painstakingly considers all degrees of pros and cons in making a
perfectly utilitarian decision is subject to an astonishing magnitude of moral luck. The
hypothetical Gauguin who is most aware of his fallibility and works to avoid any sort
of decision-related negligence acts this way because of constitutive luck and perhaps a
VWURQJHQYLURQPHQWDOLQXHQFH FLUFXPVWDQWLDOOXFN LQWKHIRUPRIVWURQJSDUHQWLQJ
a good upbringing, etc. Therefore, Rosebury fails to explain how we can make moral
judgments while ignoring moral luck, though he does touch on a compelling idea; it
seems that constitutive luck and, to an extent, circumstantial luck, should be held to a
GLHUHQWVWDQGDUGWKDQSXUHO\FRQVHTXHQWLDOOXFN,ZLOODGGUHVVWKLVQRWLRQODWHU
1DWKDQ +DQQD   SUHVHQWV D VLPLODUO\ DZHG UHMHFWLRQ RI 1DJHOӵV DFFRXQW RI
moral luck. He also seems to make the mistake of ignoring constitutive luck, as many
detractors of Nagel do. Hanna outlines the case of George and Georg, two assassins
who intend to kill a target, with Georg failing to do so as a truck blocks his line of sight
 +HFODLPVWKDWZHFDQHQGRUVHWKH&RQWURO3ULQFLSOHӱ:HDUHPRUDOO\DVVHVVDEOH
only to the extent that what we are assessed for depends on factors under our control
 ӱDQGVWLOOKROGWKDW*HRUJDQG*HRUJHVKRXOGEHMXGJHGPRUDOO\GLHUHQWO\RQ
the grounds that they’re not assessable for the same things, as one murdered someone
and the other didn’t. Hanna then goes on to claim that though the lack of control of
circumstances entails a lack of control over what options are available, it doesn’t entail
a lack of control over which of these options Georg and George ultimately take. This
OHDGVWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWӷIRUDOO&3VD\VVRPHRQHZKRGRHVQӵWPXUGHUEHFDXVHKH
ZDVQӵW SUHVHQWHG ZLWK WKH UHTXLVLWH RSSRUWXQLWLHV FDQ EH DVVHVVHG GLHUHQWO\ IURP D
PXUGHUHUӸ  7KLVPD\EHWUXHIRUWKHYHU\SDUWLFXODULVRODWHGFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKH
Georg/George hypothetical (the presence or lack thereof of the truck), but there are
WZRUHDVRQVZK\WKLVUHDVRQLQJLVDZHG,WLVWKHLQWHQWLRQWRNLOOWKDWZHDUHDVVHVVLQJ
here when making a moral judgment of the two assassins, an intention that is the same
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for the two and thus would lead to the same moral judgment, and also it is clear, again,
that even if we are accurately judging the intention, we are failing to recognize that the
constitutive and circumstantial factors that led them to this dastardly intention were
out of their control as well. Thus, Hanna fails to discredit circumstantial luck in this
case as he claimed to.
At this point, we are at much the same troubling crossroads where the unsettling
conclusion of Nagel’s conception of moral luck remains unscathed. Nagel foresaw the
DPELWLRXVIXWLOLW\RIPRUDOOXFNӵVGHWUDFWRUVODEHOLQJLWӷDPLVWDNHWRDUJXHIURPWKH
XQDFFHSWDELOLW\RIWKHFRQFOXVLRQVWRWKHQHHGIRUDGLHUHQWDFFRXQWRIWKHFRQGLWLRQV
RIPRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\Ӹ  %HIRUHGHOYLQJLQWR6XVDQ:ROIӵVDVWXWHDWWHPSWWREXFN
WKH WUHQG DQG ӷQG WKH PRUDO LQ WKH SKHQRPHQRQ RI PRUDO OXFN :ROI   Ӹ LW
is important to examine Williams’ notion of agent regret. Agent regret is a type of
regret that can only be aimed toward one’s own actions, and involves the agent taking
responsibility for the regretful act (1981, 29). Returning to the example of Gauguin,
Williams suggests that the feeling of agent regret based upon retrospective attitudes of
his failure can be deemed a moral act itself, and thus perhaps shows that factors out of
WKHDJHQWӵVFRQWURO WKHXOWLPDWHVXFFHVVRUIDLOXUHRI*DXJLQӵVGHFLVLRQ FDQLQXHQFH
the moral assessment of the decision (36). Nagel does not buy this explanation, and
asserts that Williams fails to explain why these retrospective feelings can be deemed
PRUDOWKXVPDLQWDLQLQJWKHORJLFWKDWPRUDOHYDOXDWLRQVFDQQRWEHMXVWLHGE\IDFWRUV
the agent cannot control. Rosebury echoes this contention, stating that agent regret
exists only because one can never be sure that they are truly free of negligence in
committing a regretful act, and thus there is no reason to believe that these moral luckEUHGIHHOLQJVUHHFWPRUDOLW\  7KLVEULQJVXVWR:ROIӵVWDNHRQWKHPDWWHUVRI
agent regret and the moral status of this distinctive, luck-based emotion.
Wolf is primarily concerned with investigating the phenomenon of consequential luck,
DQGEHOLHYHVWKDWZKDWVKHFDOOVWKHӷUDWLRQDOLVWSRVLWLRQ  ӸRIPRUDOOXFNLQZKLFK
one believes that equal recklessness deserves equal blame regardless of consequences
in the negligent driver example, is incomplete. Before getting into the crux of her
argument, she notes that it appears problematic to suggest that the human tendency
WR EODPH SHRSOH GLHUHQWO\ EDVHG RQ KRZ PXFK KDUP WKH\ FDXVHG UDWKHU WKDQ KRZ
QHJOLJHQWWKH\ZHUHFDQEHH[SODLQHGHQWLUHO\E\LQVXFLHQWNQRZOHGJHDQGLUUDWLRQDO
emotions (6). Though in the abstract, the rationalist position seems quite appealing, if
LWLVDFFXUDWHO\HPSOR\HGLQUHDOZRUOGWKHUHVXOWDQWEHKDYLRUFDQEHTXLWHRSXWWLQJ
In a hypothetical, rationalist world where the driver who kills a child receives the same
amount of moral blame as the equally negligent driver who kills no one, this would
entail that the killer driver blames himself as much as the solely negligent driver blames
himself. Though the driver who was simply negligent would be sad to learn that a child
had died and perhaps attribute a level of blame to himself due to an acknowledgement
of a slight negligence that could have led to the same result, this does not account for the
VSHFLFDJHQWUHJUHWWKDWZHZRXOGDQWLFLSDWHWKHNLOOHUGULYHUWRVXHU1RZLPDJLQH
the killer driver who is able to embody the rationalist position and assume the same
36
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amount of self-blame as the purely negligent driver, feeling a twinge of grieving and
regret at his small amount of negligence, but also able to distance himself from intense
agent regret through realization of his unlikely degree of consequential luck. As Wolf
notes, there is something rather disturbing about this fully rational driver’s detaching
himself from the child’s death, despite how conceptually coherent this attitude may be
 ,WFRQYH\VDQXQGHVLUDEOHDQGDUJXDEO\XQDFFHSWDEOHZD\RIOLYLQJӱDQLQVWLQFWLYHO\
immoral lack of agent regret.
It is this line of reasoning that brings Wolf to propose that adequately taking
responsibility for one’s actions and the ensuing consequences in cases such as this, despite
their being prone to consequential luck-based factors outside of the agent’s control, is
DYLUWXHLQLWVHOI6KHGHHPVWKLVYLUWXHWKHӷQDPHOHVVYLUWXH  ӸDQGRHUVFRPSHOOLQJ
reasoning for its being a virtue deserving of moral assessment. Wolf argues that this
nameless virtue is akin to the virtue of generosity as its presence in those bestowed with
LWXUJHVWKHPWRDSSUHFLDWHWKHHHFWVRIWKHLUDFWLRQVUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHGHJUHHRIOXFN
LQYROYHG DV ӷVLJQLFDQW IRU ZKR >WKH\@ DUH DQG IRU ZKDW >WKH\@ VKRXOG GRӸ   %\
accounting for this virtue, we can consistently be rationalists when it comes to levying
EODPHRQRWKHUVZKLOHDOVRDOORZLQJIRUWZRDJHQWVZKRH[SHULHQFHGGLHUHQWUHVXOWV
EDVHGRQSXUHFRQVHTXHQWLDOOXFNWRUHDFWGLHUHQWO\WRWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHVLWXDWLRQV,I
it is true that this nameless virtue exists, then the strength of consequential luck is put
LQWRGRXEWDQGSHUKDSVRQHFDQYDOLGO\PDNHPRUDOMXGJPHQWVWKDWDUHLQXHQFHGE\
this particular type of luck.
However, many are skeptical that this nameless virtue can be branded thusly, and
further doubt the morality of this type of emotion. As stated earlier, though Nagel
does not directly respond to Wolf, he fails to endorse the view that such retrospectivelyLQXHQFHGIHHOLQJVFDQEHODEHOHGDVPRUDO7KHUHLVDOVR5RVHEXU\ӵVLPSRUWDQWSRLQW
that this allegedly-virtuous feeling of agent regret may not be moral as it is a byproduct
of agents’ inevitable lack of certainty that it is ever solely consequential luck that causes
their misdoings. These are valid criticisms, and I feel that Rosebury’s in particular
is important to consider when discussing the nameless virtue. Even if an agent were
to perfectly subscribe to the rationalist position, no one could ever be granted all
the epistemological information necessary to be sure that their misfortune was
governed purely by consequential luck. Still, something does seem perturbing about a
hypothetical agent--certain that poor consequential luck is all that played a role in the
KRUULEOHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIKLVDFWLRQӱZKRLVQHYHUWKHOHVVDEOHWRGLYRUFHKLPVHOIIURP
the act. I believe the existence of this nameless virtue can be argued ad nauseam, and
though no one can be certain of its existence, it does put into doubt consequential luck’s
strength. A subcategory of moral luck such as constitutive luck, on the other hand, is
not subject to such doubt. Taking the nameless virtue to be legitimate, those who aren’t
endowed with it surely aren’t as a result of constitutive luck, and thus cannot be morally
judged on the grounds of constitutive luck if we adhere to the control principle. This
EULQJVXVEDFNWRWKHQRWLRQWKDWFHUWDLQW\SHVRIPRUDOOXFNӱLWVHHPVFRQVWLWXWLYHDQG
FLUFXPVWDQWLDOOXFNӱFDQEHKHOGWRDGLHUHQWVWDQGDUGWKDQFRQVHTXHQWLDOOXFN OXFN
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based on antecedent circumstances is essentially a mixture of the former two types).
Though Hanna attempted to demonstrate that one can adhere to the control principle
DQGVWLOOPDNHPRUDOMXGJPHQWVLQXHQFHGE\FLUFXPVWDQWLDODQGFRQVWLWXWLYHOXFNLW
seems that this belief has yet to be the least bit supported.
We have again circled back to the same troubling starting point, albeit with a potential
EORZWRFRQVHTXHQWLDOOXFN ZKLFKQRQHWKHOHVVVHHPVWREHLQXHQFHGE\WKHLQWHUDFWLRQ
between constitutive and circumstantial luck). What are we to do with the troubling
idea that, if we subscribe to the reasonable belief that people should not be morally
judged for factors beyond their control, then we cannot make any moral judgments
whatsoever? Perhaps we can rest easier knowing that the world can more hopefully
approach order if we reject this logical conclusion in favor of a more practical and
rational one that promotes judgments that resemble moral assessments even if they do
not adhere to the control principle. In his postscript to his original article on moral
luck, Williams pushes back against Nagel’s rebuttal, explaining that the case of Gauguin
VKRZVWKDWRQHFDQEHUDWLRQDOO\MXVWLHGLQGHFLVLRQVEDVHGRQPRUDOOXFNLIQRWPRUDOO\
MXVWLHG  ,QHVWDEOLVKLQJWKDWRXUUDWLRQDOMXGJPHQWRIVRPHRQHӵVGHFLVLRQFDQEH
based on factors outside of that person’s control, we can propose the existence of a
type of value, separate from moral value if we adhere to Nagel, that can allow us to
avoid the damning implication of Nagel’s concept of moral luck. It would certainly be
convenient, reasonable, and practical to do so, even if we do not semantically consider
these judgments to be morally-driven assessments.
In doing so, we can accept the insultingly reasonable assertion that Mother Teresa and
Hitler are, indeed, not deserving of equal blame. Surely someone like Sophie Scholl
deserves to be lauded for her heroism, while a man such as Adolf Eichmann deserves
severe punishment, even when taking into account the strength of their respective
environmental and constitutive factors. Though Eichmann can be held as morally
accountable as a crimeless man living in present-day Germany who would have
committed the same crimes in Eichmann’s circumstances, the latter person could not be
held accountable for his constitution as his latent immorality would not have a chance
to make itself apparent. Thus, the problem with adhering to moral luck and the control
principle is that assuming such a position leads to practical disasters in the punitive
and laudatory realms. If certain intentions or constitutions were similarly punished
regardless of their consequences or circumstances, then punishment would become
ubiquitous in society and nary a person could trust another. On the other hand, if
we deviate from Nagel’s unsettling conclusion and endorse the non-moral value that
Williams endorsed in his postscript, we will surely enjoy a healthier, more utilitarian
society.
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Concluding remarks
Indeed, the philosophical implications of Nagel’s paper are tremendously damaging
to such sacred values as fair moral evaluation and human agency, but it is clear that
we should not and do not have to (and imaginably could not) apply this disquieting
philosophy to our lives and most precious values. As Roger Crisp (2017) outlines in his
essay on moral luck and the equality of moral opportunity, rewarding actual successes
DQG SXQLVKLQJ DFWXDO KDUPV ZKLOH LJQRULQJ WKH FULWLFDO HHFWV RI IDFWRUV RXWVLGH RI
SHRSOHӵV FRQWURO ӷZLOO HQFRXUDJH SHRSOH WR WU\ KDUGHU WR VXFFHHGӿ >DQG@ PRWLYDWH
agents to take greater care than they otherwise would to avoid bad outcomes, such as
XQLQWHQGHGNLOOLQJVӸ  7KRXJKWKHZHLJKWRIPRUDOOXFNLVLQHVFDSDEOHLWVRSSUHVVLYH
hold on humanity must be largely ignored if it is our aim to foster a world of order and
goodness.
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